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It occurred to me not long ago that each time I read something new I pay special 
attention, without really meaning to, to how the work projects forward into a future or 
futures. This has been going on, I now think, for some years. Perhaps this quasi-
conscious reading practice has played a part in the recalibration of my own 
orientations to the future, which, with every new climatic event, seem to grow dizzier 
and more disorganized, feeling some of the time like players in a game of musical 
chairs. Whether it be in relation to “All Around the Mulberry Bush” or something 
else, the visceral feeling that tunes most familiar to you—tunes that, indeed, have 
helped to compose your being—could cut out at any time can, to be sure, take a toll. 
After a while, even despairing visions of the future may exert an appeal as the degree 
of uncertainty you must swallow to remain open to what may come seems only ever to 
move in one direction. But I have come to think that, politically speaking, resisting the 
urge to plunk down on the nearest chair can make a difference. For, at least some of 
the time, we pay for resolution in attachment to this world.1    
 Reading Timothy Luke’s Anthropocene Alerts prompted me to reconsider this 
thesis. Beyond highlighting Luke’s perceptive and forward-looking thinking, the 
volume documents the longstanding tendency in his work to rethink critical theory 
with attention to ecology. By developing critical theory’s critique of reason, Luke has 
offered a much-needed model of what a theory would have to do in order to measure 
the extent of the damage—planetary, political, personal, and so forth—being done. 
That model is what Luke calls “ecocritique,” or “the relentless contestation of the 
politics of nature, economy, and culture as the core of a critical theory of the 
contemporary.”2 Another key takeaway from the volume concerns the indispensability 
 
1 Derrick Bell’s “racism is permanent” thesis may suggest the most pertinent and 
interesting contrast to this view. See Bell, Faces at the Bottom of the Well: The 
Permanence of Racism (New York: Basic Books, 1992). 	
2 Timothy W. Luke, Anthropocene Alerts: Critical Theory of the Contemporary as 
Ecocritique (Candor, NY: Telos), 1.	
This article has been accepted for publication in New Political Science, published by Taylor & Francis. It  appears 
online at  https://doi.org/10.1080/07393148.2020.1847534. 
2	
of attention to political economy in eco-politics. I continue to learn from Luke on this 
score. But I also wonder if greater explicit attention to ecological processes and 
forces—to nature’s own powers and propensities—might have altered the analytic 
tone one hears across the essays in this volume. For my reading suggests that an early 
sense of possibility in the text dims over time. Its concluding engagement with the 
work of Theodor Adorno may suggest that, given the present reach of climate and 
biodiversity crises, few possibilities remain to inflect our existing ecocidal 
consumption and production practices in more just and eco-viable directions.  
If Luke is perhaps uncertain whether by now anything can actually be done, he 
may believe that critical theory in the form of ecocritique offers the best, or even only, 
hope of clawing out a viable and worthy path ahead. True, select chapters contain 
affirmative engagements with figures not typically cast within traditions of critical 
theory—Edward Abbey, for instance, and Ted Kaczinsky, whose “manifesto,” Luke 
says, “makes so many valid criticisms against industrial society that it cannot be 
ignored.”3 But it sometimes seems as if the study’s numerous other interlocutors are 
regarded as downright clueless, dangerous, or both. Three categories of interlocutor, 
not necessarily mutually-exclusive, stood out to me in particular (the categories are 
mine, not Luke’s). First are the aspiring techno-masters—among them sustainability 
scientists, earth system scientists, and “Anthropocenarians”—who seek to understand 
earth processes in order to control them and whose politics embody a similar top-
down technocratic ethos. Then there are the mystifiers: arcologists, for example 
(although “dressed in the garb of theological celebration,” Paolo Soleri’s arcology is 
actually “a tremendous megamachine…”), at least some eco-activists (“one soon 
realizes that most eco-activism is a scam”), and, perhaps, deep ecologists. Finally, one 
encounters the rosy dupes, the ecopoets, new materialists, and environmental literary 
critics who lack courage “to face the contradictions of contemporary reality” and 
whose “pathetic pleas to each other” to “end environmental racism or technocapitalist 
waste as we know it” fail even to question “what is really being made lyrical in a 
society rendering itself and its detritus into stone.”4 Not so closely aligned with critical 
theory myself—I rather suspect my political-theoretical proclivities lump me in among 
 
3 Luke, Anthropocene Alerts, 158.	
4 Luke, Anthropocene Alerts, 294-295.	
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the dupes!—in the remainder of this essay, I will draw from the work of a few thinkers 
in other traditions in order to explore some possibilities of ecocritique that emerge 
when thought is understood not only in terms of “reason,” but also as processes that, 
while distinctive, are not exceptional among the many diverse processes of nature.5 To 
play up how critique, when understood in this way, is always advanced in relation to 
specific ecological processes (or “forces”), I will refer to my spin on Luke’s concept as 
eco-critique from now on.  
While what I mean by eco-critique will be fleshed out more fully as the essay 
progresses, let me say a few additional words about it here. Criticism, as I understand 
it and as Michel Foucault writes, “does not consist in saying that things are not good 
as they are”; rather, it “consists in seeing what kinds of self-evidences [évidences], 
liberties, acquired and non-reflective modes of thought, the practices we accept rest 
on.”6 The conceit of criticism understood in this way is that to think in a different way 
is also, at least in some sense, to live in a different world—that, in the words of Alfred 
North Whitehead, “as we think, we live.”7 Explaining why for him criticism is so 
crucial in politics, and why reform and critique are not opposed or even fully separate, 
Foucault says: “thought often hides itself, but it always animates everyday behavior. 
There is always a little bit of thought even in the silliest institutions, always some 
thought even in mute habits.”8 If you have heard about the scientists who—concerned 
that intensifying hurricanes are distorting meteorological classifications—suggest the 
need for a new class of storm, that of the Category 6 hurricane, you may be wondering 
to yourself about my suggestion: greater explicit attention to nature’s own powers can 
inspire a stronger sense of future possibility? But we do not only imagine or otherwise 
 
5 In referring to thought as a force of nature in the title of this essay, I am not 
suggesting the existence of any kind of universal spirit which need only be put back in 
control in order for harmony to be restored. Like Luke, I admire certain aspects of 
deep ecology even as I am at odds with the major ontologies and modes of politics 
associated with that tradition. For a longer discussion, see Erev, “What Is It Like to 
Become a Bat? Heterogeneities in an Age of Extinction,” Environmental Humanities 10, 
no. 1 (2018): 129-149.	
6 Foucault, “Is It Really Important To Think? An Interview with Michel Foucault 
translated by Thomas Keenan,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 9, no. 1 (1982): 30-40, 33.	
7 Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought (New York: The Free Press, 1968), 63.	
8 Foucault, “Is It Really Important To Think?,” 33.	
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represent the future; we also feel the passage of thens into nows, of nows verging 
onto…who-knows-what’s coming into being. Taking up Foucault’s notion of criticism 
as “the work of thought on itself” in an expansive way,  I’ll explore certain material 
practices of relating-otherwise to the bodies and forces of the earth as practices of 
eco-critique. 9 The essay concludes with a few remarks on the politics of eco-critique 




On the Nature of Critique 
 
Reading Anthropocene Alerts, one is struck by its author’s prescience. Let me show you 
what I mean: 
 
1980: The Left is presently in crisis since, like the system it opposes, it refuses 
to acknowledge the ecological constraints limiting further developments of 
advanced industrial societies.11  
1983: [S]ome observers…see a post-industrial informationalized society as an 
environmentally sound economic order. […] Instead, informational capital’s 
program for cybernetically managing the earth’s ecological collapse from space 
must be recognized as an environmental false promise that neither America’s 
neoconservatives nor its neoliberals can really fulfill.12 
 
These claims support the objection Luke raises to “Anthropocenarians” and others 
that, in fact, plenty of people have been calling out the planetary dangers of extractive 
capitalism for decades. His critique of the Anthropocene concept, understood “as a 
valid scientific benchmark,” as well as of the motives of those “pushing to ratify” it as 
such addresses two related dangers. Briefly, he worries—I think rightly—that such a 
 
9 Ibid., 34-35.	
10 Anna Tsing, Heather Swanson, Elaine Gan, and Nils Bubant (eds), Arts of Living on a 
Damaged Planet (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2017).	
11 Luke, Anthropocene Alerts, 17.	
12 Ibid., 26.	
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species-level focus flattens crucial distinctions, failing to capture, for example, how 
“many suffer considerably, while only a few profit tremendously”13 from the 
destructive processes under way. And he further criticizes the sorts of politics that the 
Anthropocene idea seems to him likely to authorize and promote: “[t]hey rule, and all 
others will follow their rules.”14 In Luke’s case, by contrast, the alarms have been 
intended not only to warn others of dangers to come, but also to promote political 
activism that might inflect existing political and economic processes in more eco-
populist directions. By “eco-populism” I take Luke to envision a largely though not 
exclusively restorative political project, one that aims to restore to regional 
communities the capacities to define and meet their own needs while also restoring 
nature “directly into everyday life in more subjective aesthetic or ethical forms”—
restoring (many) people’s sense, that is, that nature is and “must be treated as an equal 
vital presence.”15 I say that Luke’s eco-populism is not exclusively restorative for at 
least two reasons: first, rather than calling for the abolition of modern technologies, 
he at one point highlights the potential promise of “a populist ‘ecotechnics’” which 
would wrest control of existing technologies from corporations and centralized state 
power in order to afford individuals and communities the means to attain “a 
downsized but satisfying standard of living”16; and he also seems to regard at least 
certain historical formations of power-knowledge to be in some respects indelible, and 
thus envisions the need to re-appropriate such formations towards more just ends. 
Luke’s study points readers to minor fissures or “contradictions” in the existing 
order which, after rigorous critical examination, might be exploited in order to turn 
things around. Consider two examples. Luke writes in 1995 that even as recent 
instantiations of populism arise “out of advanced industrialism,” they are not 
predestined to do its bidding. Noting that “even the most system-affirming corporate 
technologies contain self-subversive moments,” he argues that the system of 
“bureaucratically controlled consumption…can be undone” by “destructively 
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ecological ‘doing’”.17 In 1983 Luke notes how, “to compensate for the withering away of 
public goods,” those invested in saving capitalism might “simulate” the provision “of 
free schools, neighborhood councils, backyard gardening, and frugality philosophies.” 
Yet with determined efforts in the medium term, he says, ecological political action 
might coopt “these alternative institutions and techniques” in order to develop “a 
more rational, equal, and participatory society through self-reliance and communal 
interaction.”18  
On my reading, however, partway through the essays collected here this sense of 
possibility fades; one must look harder for an opening through which positively to 
respond to new “alerts” being issued. In conversation with Adorno—who, it is argued, 
managed always to retain a “spirit of hope”19—the volume concludes in an ambiguous 
and, to my ears, perhaps somber tone: “[a]t best,” Luke says, “if there is some good to 
be found, the environmental speculations in Anthropocene discourses are perhaps 
only the latest mystified ‘allegories of the possibility’ that allow some to believe we 
now are defying doom.”20 If critical theory as ecocritique promised at least the 
possibility of “reorder[ing] everyday life” earlier on,21 I am not sure that the same 
degree of faith in its (or any other) approach persists today; although the volume’s 
most recent essay calls for ongoing genesis of ever-more ecocritique, the projected 
payoff of such efforts is that, with the insights generated, “collapse need not be 
complete…”22 
I am not confident that Luke’s outlook has changed in the way described. If it has, 
though, this would seem to mark a departure from another tendency in his thinking, 
too. I refer to Luke’s tendency to affirm a variable degree of openness in even the most 
entrenched systems of thought and control. This tendency finds expression when, 
reflecting upon the outsized influence of the political-economic processes of 
informational capitalism (among other capitalisms) criticized throughout the text, Luke 
says: “control is never total, no concept exhausts the pre-categorical fullness of life, 
 
17 Ibid., 133, 134.	
18 Ibid., 43.	
19 Ibid., 303.	
20 Ibid., 303, quoting Adorno, “Mammoth.”	
21 Luke, Anthropocene Alerts, 43.	
22 Ibid., 15.	
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humanity evinces its worthiness against domination, and degradation is not yet 
absolute destruction.”23 Also, in earlier chapters, each time a fissure or “contradiction” 
is called to light, Luke is careful to note that there are no guarantees. With this, I 
think, he seeks to caution as well as to egg on: something about the conditions of this 
world make it such that the consequences of eco-populist efforts are not fully 
determined by those efforts, just as the ultimate effects of capitalist processes are not 
wholly at the whim of those pulling the strings. What, though, is that something? What 
explains why being exceeds identity? Why control is never total? And what does it have 
to do with human dignity? 
Like Luke (and Adorno), Friedrich Nietzsche is skeptical of scientific approaches 
claiming or even aspiring to conquer the unknown. To him such “pale atheisms” 
express the spirit of ressentiment, a form of resentment arising not in response to a 
specific injury or harm received, but rather to the most basic conditions of your 
existence (whatever you understand those to be). Besides, the idea of total knowledge 
is an absurdity to Nietzsche, as it implies a perspective beyond perspectivity—and 
absolute, rather than relational, identities of knower and known. But such identities 
are actually entangled; coming to know something is also to change it and to be 
changed by it in turn. “Something unconditioned cannot be known,” Nietzsche 
needles Kantians in an aphorism entitled Against the scientific prejudice; “otherwise it 
would not be unconditioned!”24 He continues: “[c]oming to know means ‘to place 
oneself in a conditional relation to something’; to feel oneself conditioned by 
something and oneself to condition it—.”25 The fact of such entanglement throws a 
wrench in reductivist materialist philosophies of nature, which, Nietzsche thinks, 
express “the faith in a world that is supposed to have its equivalent and its measure in 
human thought and human valuations”—a world “that can be mastered completely 
and forever with the aid of our square little reason.”26 Despite the many readings of 
Nietzsche that proclaim him an “irrationalist,” Nietzsche’s gripe is not with reason or 
 
23 Ibid., 300.	
24 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Walter Kaufmann (ed.), translated by Walter 
Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), #555.	
25 Ibid.	
26 Nietzsche, The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs, 
translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1974), 335  (# 373).	
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reasoning per se; it is, rather, with the demand that existence itself be rational. Such a 
demand is not only dangerous; it is also depleting:  
What? Do we really want to permit existence to be degraded for us like this—
reduced to a mere exercise for a calculator and an indoor diversion for 
mathematicians? Above all, one should not wish to divest existence of its rich 
ambiguity: that is a dictate of good taste, gentlemen, and taste of reverence for 
everything that lies beyond your horizon.27 
For Luke’s Adorno, the method most appropriate to meditating “about damaged 
life on a damaged planet” is “Nietzsche’s philosophy as melancholic science.”28 To me, 
Nietzsche’s science is a gay science, and I find its emphasis upon affirmation and the 
irreducible element of wildness in being—its affirmation that, in Anna Tsing and 
fellow editors’ words, “[l]ife has been monstrous almost from its beginnings”29—a 
fruitful starting point from which to explore how eco-critique could figure among the 
many arts of living on a damaged planet needed today.  
Please do not get me wrong. Suggesting the importance of affirmation in eco-
politics is not, to put the point as a critic might, to suggest that all we need to do is 
smile for everything to turn out okay. As I write this, federal agents kidnap protestors 
demanding an end to America’s ruthless, systemic violence against Black people; a 
global pandemic decimates untold lives and livelihoods around the world; millions of 
people suffer needlessly even in wealthy countries following decades of state 
divestment and a “just-in-time” ethos which left hospitals under-staffed and -supplied 
despite repeated warnings from public health experts of pandemics to come; rates of 
domestic violence skyrocket as so many victims find themselves trapped in their 
homes; missionaries, exploiting the global crisis, invade Indigenous lands and spread 
disease while miners and other land-grabbers continue their pillaging crusades; the 
Trump administration quietly (and not so quietly) accelerates its relentless campaign 
to plunder the earth—and the animal, plant, and human-animal bodies, many of them 
Brown and Black, obstructing its way—in what appears increasingly like a murder-
suicide on a massive scale. Affirming the element of unruliness or wildness in things—
 
27 Ibid. (emphasis in original).	
28 Luke, Anthropocene Alerts, 300.	
29 Tsing et al, Arts of Living, M5.	
This article has been accepted for publication in New Political Science, published by Taylor & Francis. It  appears 
online at  https://doi.org/10.1080/07393148.2020.1847534. 
9	
and in us—is not sufficient to bring about more beautiful, anti-racist eco-egalitarian 
futures. But it can render such efforts better attuned to minor fissures when and 
where they emerge. Said another way, it can prime such efforts to ride the wave of 
cracks now rippling across existing institutions and habits of desire thanks to 
extraordinary and long overdue mass protests, but also to the relentless assault of a 
microscopic virus and ever more frequent pulses of climate disorder. 
Back to eco-critique and arts of living on a damaged planet. To review, I discuss 
such arts in terms of eco-critique not only because I share Luke’s conviction that 
critique today must issue from expressly ecological perspectives. I also do so (this time 
moving away, perhaps, from ecocritique in Luke’s sense) because I want to explore 
how eco-forces can be understood to participate in critical practices in ways that 
render such practices potentially more risky but also up the chances of their achieving 
something important and worthwhile. To do so, I am taking up Foucault’s criticism as 
“the work of thought on itself” in an expansive way, to include certain material 
practices, too.30  
An example can be found in the work of Jamaica Kincaid. Like Luke, Adorno, and 
Nietzsche, Kincaid also criticizes Euro-Enlightenment modes of thought or “reason.” 
But her work focuses largely on how such modes of thought animated the attempted 
genocide of native Caribbean peoples and the kidnapping and enslavement of native 
peoples of Africa.31 I say largely because Kincaid’s work explores the ways these 
murderous campaigns were bound up with another imperial project of that period: 
taxonomy, or the classification of earth’s many diverse species according to a universal 
putatively objective scheme. As one consequence of this “universalizing knowledge 
project,” numerous peoples of the earth soon lost vital categories of experience and 
expectation as local names for and ways of relating to heterogeneous “earth others” 
 
30 Foucault, “Is It Really Important to Think?,” 34-35.	
31 Jamaica Kincaid’s essay “Ovando” may represent her most sustained and trenchant 
critique of Euro-Enlightenment orientations to self, other, materiality, and time. See 
Kincaid, “Ovando,” Conjunctions 14 (1989): 75-83. I refer here to attempted genocide as a 
way to acknowledge the impressive campaigns of resistance waged by so many native 
peoples against the conquistadors. But it is possible that use of the term is 
inappropriate in this context; Kincaid’s grandmother was Carib Indian, a people 
Kincaid has suggested did not actually survive European “contact.”	
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were displaced by the grand new order of things.32  
Kincaid explains that it was while working in her first garden that she realized “you 
could write a history of an empire through plants.”33 Michael Shapiro has noted how, 
for Kincaid, gardening is also “‘an exercise in memory.’”34 In gardening Kincaid finds 
“a way of remembering my own immediate past, a way of getting to a past that is my 
own.”35 In this way, Shapiro suggests gardening can be understood as “a practice of 
counter-memory, a recoding and recovery of the world effaced by the botanical part of 
imperialism’s coding practices.”36 Although not emphasized in Shapiro’s thoughtful 
reading, attention to how natural beings and processes often assume “ethical forms” 
and “possess an equal vital presence” in Kincaid’s work invites consideration, in a 
speculative way, of whether the other diverse materialities present on the scene play a 
part in the practice. Kincaid writes, for example, of her activities in the garden one day: 
“I moved the Scabiosa ochroleuca into the yellow bed—it is yellowish and tall and airy 
and wants to go everywhere it feels will be susceptible to its presence (I am reminded 
of myself, except for the yellowish part).”37  
For people who, like some of my ancestors, may have internalized white 
supremacy’s justification for their subordination (the claim that subjectivity and 
culture arise from domination of nature), restoring nature to ethics and a sense of its 
vital presence—which, like Luke, I take to be crucial to any viable ecopolitics today—
requires first affirming the nature within. While not quite a movement, perhaps, an 
emerging tendency in this direction exists—for example, at the Black Futures Farm in 
 
32 The concept of “earth others” is Val Plumwood’s. On the Enlightenment’s 
“universalizing knowledge project,” see Michael J. Shapiro, “Securing the American 
Ethnoscape,” in Deforming American Political Thought: Challenging the Jeffersonian 
Legacy (Taylor and Francis, 2016), 15.	
33 Kathleen M. Balutansky and Jamaica Kincaid, “On Gardening: An Interview with 
Jamaica Kincaid,” Callaloo 25, no. 3 (2002): 790-800, 793.	
34 Kincaid, My Garden (Book): (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1999), 8, quoted 
in Shapiro, “Securing the American Ethnoscape,” 15.	
35 Kincaid, My Garden (Book):, 8.	
36 Shapiro, “Securing the American Ethnoscape,” 15.	
37 Kincaid, My Garden (Book):, 27.	
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Portland, Oregon, whose stated aim is “to restore Black people to the land.”38 One 
need not ignore the perils of the present, nor even take a rosy outlook on these 




















38 See Crystal Ligori and Jenn Chavez, “A Portland Farm Seeks to Restore Black People to the Land,” 
Oregon Public Broadcasting/OPB.org (July 21, 2020), available online at: 
https://www.opb.org/news/article/black-futures-farm-portland-agriculture-black-food-sovreignty/.		
